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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In his opening brief in this matter, petitioner Williams 
previously set forth the facts upon which this appeal is based. 
Those facts will not be repeated here. However, in the context 
of this reply brief, we note the following: 
First, it should be noted that NewVector Communications, 
Inc. ("NewVector") and the Mountain States Telephone & Telegraph 
Company ("Mountain States") were both parties to the proceeding 
below and in that sense they come before the Court in a little 
different context than the typical amicus curiae. 
Second, when they requested an opportunity to file an amici 
curiae brief, NewVector and Mountain States represented to the 
Court that the purpose and intent of the brief was to call to the 
attention of the Court an interpretation of the Public Telecommu-
nications Act which had not been presented in the briefs of the 
parties to this appeal. However, the brief actually filed by 
NewVector and Mountain States contains, as its first two 
arguments, challenges to this Court's jurisdiction to hear and 
determine the merits of this appeal. Since petitioner Williams 
had already filed his final reply brief before the amicus brief 
was filed, Williams sought and obtained authorization from this 
Court to file this reply brief. The only issues that will be 
addressed are those dealing with the jurisdictional challenges 
raised by NewVector and Mountain States, the other matters having 
been adequately addressed by petitioner's prior briefs. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
NewVector and Mountain States raise essentially two chal-
lenges to the jurisdiction of this Court to consider this appeal: 
First, they argue that a prerequisite to an appeal from the 
dismissal of the American Paging application is a petition for 
rehearing before the Public Service Commission ("Commission"); 
second, they contend that the exclusive recourse for review of a 
rulemaking proceeding is an action for declaratory relief before 
the district court. 
The arguments set forth in the amici curiae brief are 
erroneous for multiple reasons. First, both NewVector and 
Mountain States, as parties to the underlying proceedings, had 
ten days after the filing of the docketing statement herein to 
file a motion to dismiss these consolidated appeals for lack of 
jurisdiction pursuant to Rule 10 of the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure. They, as well as the Public Service Commission and 
American Paging of Utah, Inc. ("American Paging"), have waived 
their opportunity to raise such issues at this late juncture. 
Second, this is not an appeal from an original proceeding before 
the Commission, but a continuation of the initial proceeding 
following remand by this Court in Williams v. Public Service 
Commission, 720 P.2d 773 (Utah 1986). In the initial Commission 
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proceeding prior to the appeal in Williams, petitioner did in 
fact request a rehearing but the request was denied. Since this 
Court in Williams did not decide all of the issues but rather 
remanded it for further consideration by the Commission, the 
Court retains jurisdiction over the proceedings until the matter 
is resolved in its entirety. Thusf there was no need for an 
additional petition for rehearing. 
One of the grounds for the appeal is that the actions of the 
Commission constitute a taking of property in violation of the 
United States Constitution and the Utah Constitution. The proper 
forum for reviewing a constitutional challenge to an administra-
tive procedure is the Utah Supreme Court and not the Commission. 
The statute providing for declaratory relief from rulemaking 
proceedings is permissive and not mandatory. Moreover, the 
requirement that a party exhaust administrative remedies is not 
an absolute requirement and does not apply in the procedural 
posture of this case, particularly in light of the inconsistent 
procedural prerequisites that arise in a case such as this. 
Finally, even if the Court were to reject cases no. 860313 
and 860314, it would only postpone consideration of the issues 
since petitioner could still seek review of the purported 
rulemaking procedure and thereafter the Commission order based on 
that rule. Public policy and judicial economy require that the 
matter be resolved now. 
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ARGUMENT 
!• THE PARTIES AND AMI CI CURIAE HAVE WAIVED ANY 
OPPORTUNITY TO MOVE TO DISMISS THE APPEAL FOR 
LACK OF JURISDICTION, 
NewVector and Mountain States argue that this appeal 
must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction since (1) the peti-
tioner did not request a rehearing before the Commission with re-
spect to the application of American Paging and (2) that 
petitioner failed to seek declaratory relief from the district 
court with respect to the so-called rulemaking proceeding. This 
argument is being made here for the first time by NewVector and 
Mountain States and was not raised by them in a friendly way. 
Neither the Public Service Commission nor American Paging as-
serted such arguments. By failing to comply with Rule 10 of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, they have waived their right 
to move for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. 
Mountain States and NewVector, as parties to the pro-
ceeding below, had an opportunity to intervene in this action and 
become parties to this appeal. Had they done so, they too would 
have had ten days within which to move to dismiss the appeal for 
lack of jurisdiction as provided in Rule 10. Having failed so to 
do, they cannot now assert that motion by way of an amicus curiae 
brief. Furthermore, the jurisdictional issue attempted to be 
raised in their brief is beyond the scope of this Court's order 
permitting the filing of amici curiae brief. 
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In addition to being untimely and beyond the scope of 
the procedural order of this Court, the United States Supreme 
Court has held that a party may waive the requirement that all 
administrative remedies be exhausted before seeking judicial re-
view. Matthews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 75-77 (1976); Matthews v. 
Eldridqe, 424 U.S. 319, 328-30 (1976); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 
U.S. 749, 765 (1975). In Eldridqe, disability benefits were ter-
minated without a pretermination hearing, and the recipient 
sought review without exhausting his administrative remedies. 
Even though the Court acknowledged that the statute, 42 U.S.C. 
S 405(g), made exhaustion "a jurisdictional prerequisite" to re-
view, and even though the Court specifically found that "Eldridge 
concedes that he did not exhaust the full set of internal-review 
procedures," the Court held that the "jurisdictional prerequi-
site" to review can be waived. 424 U.S. at 327-330. 
A recognized administrative law author and expert sum-
marizes the rule coming out of this line of Supreme Court cases 
as follows: 
The proposition of law that emerges from 
these cases is an exceedingly broad one: No 
matter how clear the statutory or 
non-statutory law may be that exhaustion is 
required, the reviewing court will not re-
quire exhaustion if the agency fails to op-
pose review on grounds of lack of exhaustion. 
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, Section 20.13, p. 285 (1982 
Supp.). 
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Notwithstanding arguments by amici curiae, and notwith-
standing the fact that petitioner Williams maintains that he com-
plied with all necessary procedural prerequisites including ex-
haustion of administrative remedies, the Commission by failing to 
raise by way of motion to dismiss the exhaustion of remedies ar-
gument, has waived the argument and the appeal is now ripe for 
determination by this Court. 
Amici curiae rely on the case of Utah Department of 
Business Regulation v. Public Service Commission of Utah, 602 
P.2d 696 (Utah 1979) for the proposition that failure to apply 
for rehearing is fatal. That case is easily distinguished from 
the present case in that here the Commission did not move to dis-
miss for failure to request a rehearing be for seeking appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann, S 54-7-15. Additionally, the situa-
tion in Utah Department of Business Regulation v. Public Service 
Commission of Utah, supra, did not involve an appeal from a Com-
mission proceeding following remand, the significance of which 
will be pointed out in Section II of this brief. 
II. THE UTAH SUPREME COURT RETAINED JURISDICTION 
OVER THIS MATTER FOLLOWING ITS REMAND IN 
WILLIAMS V. PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF 
UTAH, 720 P.2d 773 (UTAH 1986). 
Regardless of whether the Commission's action following 
remand in Williams resulted in an "order" or a "rule," the appeal 
resulting from that action is not an original appeal but rather a 
second appeal following remand by the Court with instructions to 
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the Commission to rectify certain procedural deficiencies identi-
fied in Williams, Specifically, the Court in Williams said with 
reference to the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act that: 
Because the requirements of Act were not sat-
isfied, the Rule is vacated and the matter is 
remanded for further proceedings. 
720 P.2d at 777. It is generally accepted that an appellate 
court relinquishes jurisdiction over a matter following remand 
where the remand is administrative in nature and the court or 
agency below is required merely to enter a final order or ruling 
as directed by the appellate court. Jordan v. Hamada, 643 P.2d 
70, 72 (Hawaii 1982). However, where an appellate court does not 
decide all issues with finality, but rather remands a case or 
proceeding for further proceedings or findings, the appellate 
court retains jurisdiction over the matter until the court or 
agency renders a final decision in the case or until the action 
is terminated by the parties. For example, in Jordan, a public 
employee intervened in a proceeding brought by the collective 
bargaining unit of which he was a member challenging the reason-
ableness of the fee proposed by the collective bargaining unit. 
The Hawaii Public Employment Relations Board issued a decision 
after a hearing certifying the reasonableness of the service fee. 
The employee challenged the decision in circuit court raising a 
number of issues. The circuit court judge decided nine of the 
issues raised by the appeal, but remanded the three remaining 
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issues to the Public Employment Relations Board for determination 
in accordance with the circuit court's decision and order. The 
Board subsequently issued a second decision on the remanded is-
sues and the employee took a second appeal to a separate division 
of the circuit court. The circuit court, confronted with the 
second appeal, dismissed the appeal on the basis that the court 
lacked jurisdiction to entertain the second appeal where a prior 
appeal in the same case awaited final judgment. The Hawaii Su-
preme Court affirmed the actions of the circuit court and re-
jected arguments that the initial reviewing court lost jurisdic-
tion over the case following its remand to the Board. With re-
spect to that argument, the Court stated as follows: 
Appellant's position derives from a misstate-
ment of the rule enunciated in Gin v. 
Penobscot Co., 342 A.2d 270 (Me. 1975), that 
an appellate court generally loses jurisdic-
tion over a case upon its issuance of a re-
mand order, in the absence of a statutory 
proscription to the contrary. (Citation 
omitted). As stated by the Maine Supreme 
Court, this rule explicitly contemplates the 
existence of a final judgment and resolution 
of all issues involved in the case before the 
Court's power over the same is terminated. 
(Citation omitted). 
The Gin rule thus merely restates the general 
rule we adopted above which, when applied to 
the facts above, requires us to conclude that 
[the circuit court judge] correctly refused 
to hear [the case]. Moreover, we find ample 
authority for the proposition that a remand 
order such as that involved in the present 
case does not terminate the administrative 
proceedingsy but is instead only one stage of 
a single process which may continue to 
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include a second agency hearing and appeal 
therefrom. 
643 P.2d at 72 (emphasis added). The general rule referred to in 
the above quotation was stated by the Hawaii Supreme Court as 
follows: 
The precise jurisdictional question posed by 
this factual situation has not been addressed 
by many courts. Nevertheless it appears 
well-accepted that as a matter of law and of 
sound judicial policy, a court which has ac-
quired jurisdiction over a cause retains its 
power over the same to the exclusion of any 
court of coordinate jurisdiction until the 
court renders a final judgment in the case or 
until the action is terminated by the par-
ties. 
id. 
Additionally, in Pacific Gas and Electric Co. v. Fed-
eral Power Commission, 253 F.2d 536 (9th Cir. 1958), the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applied the rule 
stated above in declining jurisdiction over an appeal from a sec-
ond agency decision following remand to the agency by the Court 
of Appeals for the District of Columbia. The Ninth Circuit ex-
plained that the remand by the Court of Appeals did not terminate 
the administrative proceeding and that the initial Court of Ap-
peals retained exclusive jurisdiction to review the second agency 
order. 253 F.2d at 541. See also Great Western Broadcasting 
Corp. v. Hoffman, 214 F.Supp. 173 (N.D.Cal. 1963). 
The Utah Supreme Court retained exclusive jurisdiction 
over the proceeding which gives rise to this second appeal. 
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Thus, the district court is deprived of jurisdiction over the 
rulemaking procedure contrary to the assertion by amici curiae 
that failure to seek declaratory relief at the district court 
level has deprived this Court of jurisdiction. Moreover, peti-
tioner having already presented this matter during the initial 
proceedings to the Commission and having sought rehearing prior 
to the appeal in Williams, and then finally having gone through a 
second administrative procedure before the Commission following 
an appeal and remand, it would be a costly waste of resources, 
time and effort to impose a reuiqrement that petitioner seek yet 
another rehearing before the Commission before coming to this 
Court to determine whether the Commission complied with this 
Court's remand order. 
III. EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES IS NOT 
AN ABSOLUTE PREREQUISITE TO JUDICIAL REVIEW. 
Reduced to its simplest form, the jurisdictional issue 
raised by NewVector and Mountain States is merely a challenge 
based on the alleged failure of petitioner Williams to exhaust 
the administrative remedies. With respect to the Commission's 
dismissal of American Paging's application, that would have in-
cluded a petition for rehearing to the Commission, or at least so 
argue the amici curiae. With respect to the alleged rulemaking 
proceedings, amici curiae argue that before seeking review by 
this Court, petitioner Williams should have obtained declaratory 
relief from the district court. Assuming, arguendo, that this 
-10-
Court rejects petitioner's arguments that the Court has retained 
jurisdiction over this proceeding throughout and that the parties 
have waived any opportunity they might have had to seek dismissal 
for lack of jurisdiction, the Court would still properly have ju-
risdiction over this appeal. Amici curiae begin their analysis 
based on the preconceived notion that compliance with the rehear-
ing provision and the declaratory judgment provision are manda-
tory prerequisites to seeking an appeal. That premise is not 
necessarily accurate. In his Treatise on Administrative Law, 
Professor Davis highlighted the confusion that exists with re-
spect to the requirement that administrative remedies be ex-
hausted: 
The answer to the question whether ad-
ministrative remedies must be exhausted be-
fore a Court may review administrative action 
has always been yes and no, with no clear 
guides as to when it is yes and when it is 
no. Since 1975 the law of exhaustion has be-
come even more disorderly than it previously 
was. The lack of predictability is strong 
enough to raise the question whether the re-
quirement is governed by discretion rather 
than by law, . . . The oft repeated state-
ment that administrative remedies must be ex-
hausted is false about as often as it is 
true. 
Davis, Administrative Law Treatise, S 20.11, pp. 279-80 (1982 
Supp.). 
In addition to the situation where an agency does not 
oppose appellate review, the U.S. Supreme Court has indicated 
that it may be proper to disregard the exhaustion requirement 
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where the constitutionality of a statute is at issue and the 
agency lacks jurisdiction to determine the issue. Weinberger v. 
Salfi. 422, U.S. 749, 765 (1975). See also Moore v. City of East 
Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 526 (1977) (C.J. Berger, dissenting 
opinion). Additionally, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that the 
constitutionality of an agency's procedure may be challenged in a 
reviewing court without first challenging it in the agency and 
without first exhausting administrative remedies on other ques-
tions. Matthews v. Eldridqe, 424 U.S. 319 (1976). In the pre-
sent case, petitioner Williams is challenging the procedure en-
gaged in by the Commission as being an unconstitutional taking of 
property. The proper recourse for Williams is review by the Utah 
Supreme Court rather than rehearing by the Commission. 
In light of these holdings, and in light of the fact 
that petitioner Williams has complied with the rules, regulations 
and statutory procedures in first protesting the actions of the 
Commission in the original proceedings, thereafter seeking re-
hearing before the Commission, filing an appeal and pursuing that 
appeal to the Utah Supreme Court wherein the matter was remanded 
to the Commission, and having once again filed its protest and 
objection in the remand proceeding before the Commission and then 
finally seeking a second review by this Court of the Commission's 
compliance with the remand order, to require yet another petition 
for rehearing would be unnecessary. Petitioner Williams has 
•12-
complied with all requirements that it exhaust administrative 
remedies, and even if it had not, the necessity for such compli-
ance is inapplicable in this case and the matter should now be 
resolved on its merits and a final result reached in this case. 
IV. A DISMISSAL OF THIS CONSOLIDATED APPEAL WOULD 
MERELY PROLONG RATHER THAN PRECLUDE A DETER-
MINATION BY THIS COURT OF THE ISSUES ON AP-
PEAL. 
Even if this Court were to accept the argument of amici 
curiae that jurisdiction is lacking over case no. 860314 due to 
petitioner's failure to seek declaratory relief from the district 
court concerning the rulemaking procedure, that avenue for review 
is still open under the applicable two year statute of limita-
tions. Utah Code Ann. S 63-46a-14 (1985) provides: 
A proceeding to contest any rule on the 
grounds of noncompliance with the procedural 
requirements of this chapter shall commence 
within two years of the effective date of the 
rule. 
Thus, a decision rejecting this appeal would only delay 
a resolution of the dispute until such time as the matter could 
be presented to the district court. However, as pointed out pre-
viously, the district court is precluded from exercising juris-
diction in a declaratory judgment action due to this Court's ex-
clusive jurisdiction following remand. Moreover, the Rule-Making 
Act may on its face preclude such a procedure, given the consoli-
dated nature of this appeal: 
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A declaratory judgment by a court may be 
rendered whether or not the plaintiff has re-
quested the agency to pass upon the applica-
bility of the rule in question. However, the 
issue of applicability may not be determined 
by the district court while the issue is un-
der consideration by the agency during any 
proceeding pending before that agency or dur-
ing the time the agency's decision concerning 
applicability is subject to appeal or being 
considered on appeal. 
Utah Code Ann. S 63-46a-13(3) (emphasis added). 
Assuming that an appeal would still be available to pe-
titioner Williams in Case No. 860314 in the event of a dismissal 
herein and an adverse ruling at the district court level, then an 
appeal in Case No. 860313 would also still be available since the 
Commission's decision which forms the basis for the appeal in 
Case No. 860313 is based entirely on the alleged rulemaking pro-
ceeding which is the subject of Case No. 860314. The 
Commission's order dismissing American Paging's application in 
Case No. 860313 is not premised on notice, evidence, hearings, 
findings or conclusions. Rather, it is based solely and entirely 
on the rule adopted by the Commission deregulating paging serv-
ices and if the rule is vacated, then the Commission's dismissal 
of American Paging's application based on that rule would also be 
subject to challenge. 
-14-
V. PUBLIC INTEREST REQUIRES THAT THE ISSUES PRE-
SENTED BY THIS CONSOLIDATED APPEAL FINALLY BE 
RESOLVED. 
Petitioner has set forth numerous arguments in response 
to arguments by amici curiae challenging this Court's jurisdic-
tion to hear and resolve the substantive issues raised herein. 
With the consolidation of Williams v. American Paging, Inc. of 
Utah, Case No. 860517, with the two cases already pending, the 
identical issues are now before the Court in the context of three 
separate proceedings involving virtually identical parties. 
The time has come for this Court to follow up its deci-
sion in Williams v. Public Service Commission, supra, and resolve 
the issues presented in this consolidated appeal. To reject 
these appeals on the grounds suggested by amici curiae would re-
sult in waste, unnecessary expense and injustice to all parties 
and the public. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth hereinabove, petitioner David 
R. Williams respectfully requests that the Court reject the argu-
ments asserted by NewVector and Mountain States challenging the 
jurisdiction of this Court. Petitioner believes that all of the 
parties properly before this Court desire a final decision on 
these issues rather than delaying this matter further. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7 day of January, 
1987. 
KEITH E. TA^  
MICHAEL L. LARSEN 
of and for 
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
P. 0. Box 11898 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898 
Telephone: (801) 532-1234 
BRINTON BURBIDGE 
of and for 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
330 South 300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
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